# Let’s Meet
# 12/10/2021

## Computer Science @Bruges Campus
## Embedded Software Resilience

dr. ing. Jens Vankeirsbilck

IEEE Student Branch
KU Leuven Campus Brugge

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# Research
# @ Computer Science Bruges Campus

- Part of M-Group → focus on Connected Mechatronic Systems
  - Ultimate machine
  - Ultimate factory
- Focus on Dependability and Safety
  - Reliable communication (Bozheng, Kristof, Pejman)
  - Smart condition monitoring (Chandu, Jens D., Paul)
  - Certain Artificial Intelligence (Calvin, Keivan)
  - CoMoveIt (spin-off) (Sotirios)
  - Resilient embedded systems (Mohaddaseh, Brent, Jens Vkb)

- prof. Jeroen Boydens
- prof. Hans Hallez
- prof. Mathias Verbeke

# Embedded Software Resilience

# Overview

1) Problem Statement
2) Software-implemented Solutions
3) Software-implemented Testing
4) People

# Technological advances...

## Transistor Size




## Voltage Trend




Shrinking Transistor sizes and Lower operating voltages have created more powerful and energy efficient processors (devices)

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https://semiengineering.com/scaling-up-and-down/
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Trends-for-transistor-supply-and-threshold-voltage-scaling-with-advancement-in-CMOS_fig1_274254911

# Embedded systems are vulnerable to external disturbances!

External disturbances:

- Electromagnetic Interference;
- Alpha particles, muons, etc.;
- Temperature fluctuations;
- Supply voltage spikes;
- Etc.







The introduced bit-flips can affect the application!




$\alpha_{occurrence} > 1/day$



G. Hubert, L. Artola, "Experimental evidence of ground albedo neutron impact on soft error rate for nanoscale devices," *IEEE Trans. Nuclear Science*, 2018.

# Erroneous bit-flips can affect the application
# A closer look at the introduced errors

**Control Flow Error**
= disruption of the execution order of instructions (unwanted jumps)




No corruption,
z will be 43

Erroneous jump
z will be 11, not 43

**Data Flow Error**
= corruption of input, intermediate or output values




a = 11
0b0011 → 0b1011

No corruption,
z will be 43

a corrupted to 11,
z will be 51, not 43

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# Erroneous bit-flip detection

**Hardware Detection**
= duplicate systems and add voting logic

+ Effective

- High cost

- Low flexibility

**Software-implemented Detection**
= insert extra instruction that enable error detection

+ High flexibility

+ No need for extra hardware
  = lower cost / system

- Difficult to implement

- Introduce overhead

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# Control Flow Error Detection

```
s = 0
x = 5
s = s + 1
a = 3
s = s + 1
y = x + a
s = s + 1
y = y * x
s = s + 1
z = y + a
s = s + 1
if s != 5 then
   call errorHandler
```

No corruption,
z will be 43

Erroneous jump
s will be 4, not 5
→ error handler is called and
the system can deal with the error

# Data Flow Error Detection

```
x = 5
x_dup = 5
a = 3
a_dup = 3
y = x + a
y_dup = x_dup + a_dup
y = y * x
y_dup = y_dup * x_dup
z = y + a
z_dup = y_dup + a_dup
If z != z_dup then
   call errorHandler
```

No corruption,
z will be 43

a = 11
0b0011 → 0b1011

a corrupted to 11,
z will be 51, z_dup will be 43
→ error handler is called and
the system can deal with the error

# Research

- Control Flow Error Detection (Jens Vkb)
  - New and better Techniques: RASM and RACFED
  - Compiler plugin to automate technique implementation
    *(not discussed today)*
- Data Flow Error Detection (Venu B. Thati)
  - New and better Techniques: FDSC and ILDCC

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# Detection technique verification and validation

- Once implemented, the detection mechanism must be validated
  → faults must occur in the system

Option 1: ad hoc

Option 2: fault injection



# Research

- Developed new fault injection processes
- Implemented a fault injection tool
  - For physical targets (Python) connecting to on-chip debugger
  - For simulated targets (C++) from the Imperas simulator

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# Overview of Researchers

prof. Jeroen Boydens
prof. Hans Hallez

dr. ing. Jens Vankeirsbilck

dr. ing. Venu Babu Thati
(graduated Apr. 2020)

ing. Brent De Blaere



Mohaddaseh Nikseresht